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torists did not drive at a speed greater than their range of vision
permitted. But on today's superhighways this is simply not the
case. Furthermore, an examination of the cases demonstrates
that such an arbitrary rule is generally unworkable because of
the vast array of possible circumstances in each case. Thus, the
courts still speak of the doctrine as a general rule, but in fact the
rule is that a driver must exercise reasonable care and prudence
under the circumstances.
It is submitted that the assured clear distance doctrine is
obsolete. The courts would clarify the law in this area a great
deal by abandoning it as the so-called general rule laced with
exceptions and counter-exceptions. It has been argued that many
attorneys shy away from rear-end collision and similar cases
because they feel that the motorist who is unable to stop is
automatically liable. If this is the case, the courts could remedy
the situation by recognizing the fact that the applicable principles are those of ordinary negligence.
Winston R. Day

IMPLIED DUTIES AND THE EXECUTIVE RIGHT
There are several interests contained in the mineral right
which have become objects of commerce. The most important of
these are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

The exclusive leasing privilege or executive right;
Bonus interest;
Royalty interest; and
Interest in rentals.

Separation of these interests, especially royalty from the
others, is not uncommon. It is necessary to distinguish between
separation of these incidents and the creation of a full mineral
right to a fraction of the minerals. A fractional mineral interest
vests all the rights of a mineral servitude in the holder, whereas
a separated incident carries only those rights of the particular
interest held. The impact of this distinction becomes apparent
upon consideration of the relative positions of these two types of
interest holders. Whenever the executive right is separated from
any of the other incidents, all those rights which accompany the
leasing privilege are stripped from the newly created non-
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executive interest. Normally, the grant of reservation of the right
to execute leases carries with it the right to retention of bonuses
and rentals, but the parties may, of course, contract for a different
result. Because of the vital role the lease plays in mineral development, control of leasing by one of two interested parties
creates an unbalanced relationship between them, and the right
of the executive to retain bonuses and rentals is a distinct spur
to self-interested negotiation. Absent contractual obligations the
executive is in a position to manipulate the leasing privilege to
the detriment of the other interest holders. Thus, questions arise
as to whether the executive is under any duty to lease for the
benefit of a non-executive interest. Additionally, once the executive undertakes to act, there are problems as to the limit of
the executive's right to act in a self-interested manner. For example, the executive normally has the right to all bonuses. May
he negotiate for an extremely large bonus and a small royalty
when the choice is his as to whether the lease transaction should
be so structured, or must he take a larger royalty and a smaller
bonus? Further, there are questions concerning the interpretation
of the word "bonus." Does the term mean only cash; does it include production payments; does it include overriding royalty?
Many decisions in this area give weight to the "intent of the
parties" to the contract, but the essence of the problem is whether
the law will impose certain obligations on the executive when the
parties have been silent as a means of protecting the party who
has given to another a right which entails the power to commit
the first party to a contract under circumstances where the second party can be strongly affected by self-interest. All United
States jurisdictions facing this problem except Louisiana have
imposed implied duties on the executive in favor of the nonexecutive.' Non-executive interests take on varying forms which
may change to some degree the imbalance of the parties' positions. The non-executive interest may be joined with the ownership of the land, it may be in the form of a mineral servitude,
or may be held as a real right which is less than a servitude. The
1. 2 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 339.2, at 99, 198 (1964):
"The great weight of authority holds that some sort of duty governs the
exercise of the executive right." This source goes on to list six categories for
the decisions in the area of executive duties. The fifth and sixth categories,
(5.) "reasoning assumes no duty," (6.) "holding no duty"), are made up entirely of Louisiana decisions and federal decisions decided under Louisiana
law. See also Risinger, Recent Jurisprudence-II,in THIRTEENTH INSTITUTE ON
MINERAL LAW 133 (1966).

COMMENTS

1969]

position of this right in the structure of a particular transaction
2
may determine the susceptibility of the non-executive to abuse.
This Comment discusses the Louisiana position on duty implication in the executive, non-executive relationship.
The Louisiana Jurisprudence
The Louisiana cases have generally rejected any sort of implied duty owed the non-executive interest holder by the executive. Two basic questions have arisen in Louisiana. The first is
whether an executive who possesses the reversionary interest has
any legal duty to lease or act in any other manner to prevent
prescription of the non-executive interest. The second is whether
an executive has any implied legal duty to bargain for and obtain
fair and proportionate benefits for the non-executive's interest, if
he does lease. Cases involving either question have relied on
those involving the other as authority without clearly distinguishing the two issues. 3 Because of this interreliance, both groups
will be treated together in chronological order.
The earliest case was Mount Forest Fur Farms of America v.
Cockre1l4 decided by the Supreme Court in 1934. The dispute
concerned the distribution of lease bonuses and rentals, the disposition of which had not been provided for by contract. The
plaintiff who had purchased the land and a fraction of the minerals minus the leasing privilege contended the executive was
his agent by implication for the purpose of receiving bonuses and
rentals. The court, however, found that the parties intended that
the executive should have these benefits. The reasoning was
that the executive/vendor had bargained for the leasing power
for the purpose of obtaining for himself all the lease benefits
except those specifically granted to the non-executive. This case
simply stands for the proposition that an executive is not an
agent of a landowner (mineral interest joined) for the purpose of
receiving bonuses and rentals where there is no provision for
disposition of these benefits. Although this rejection of implied
2. Considering

the

unequal

positions

of

the executive

and

the

non-

executive, as a basis for imposing duties, the royalty holder requires more
protection than does the holder of a servitude. In regard to imposing duties

on the executive the distinction between royalty and servitude should only be
important where use requirements for prescription, or reverting royalty Interest, are issues. 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 303.8 (1964).
3. But see Uzee v. Bollinger, 178 So.2d 508 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965), distinguished from Horn v. Skelly Oil Co., 224 La. 709, 70 So.2d 657 (1954), on
these grounds.
4. 179 La. 795, 155 So. 228 (1934).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

agency is narrow when the holding is limited to the facts of the
case, it has been used as authority in a variety of situations rejecting agency and lesser duty relationships between executives
and non-executives.
Ledoux v. Voorhies,5 a 1952 Supreme Court decision, was
factually similar to Mt. Forest. The major distinctions were that
the executive was the landowner and the non-executive interest
was treated as a servitude rather than as a royalty. Again the
unmentioned bonuses and rentals were held to belong to the executive on the basis of party intention. The court explained how
it determined the intent of the parties by the statement: "bonuses
and rentals are derived from the lease itself and not from the
minerals when produced." Mt. Forest is cited as authority but no
mention is made of any implied duty relationships, agency or
otherwise. Consideration of this case with Mt. Forest reveals that
in Louisiana bonuses and rentals, unless expressly granted or
reserved, are accessories to the executive right which is either
coupled with a royalty or mineral interest.
Vincent v. Bullock6 was decided by the Supreme Court five
years after Mt. Forest. The pertinent question was whether the
landowner/executive has an implied obligation to a royalty owner to lease when a prudent administrator would have leased. The
royalty owner contended that failure to lease when a reasonable
opportunity existed created an obstacle which suspended prescription of his interest. The court held that the obstacle principle of Civil Code Article 792 did not apply to royalty interests.
rhis holding disposed of the prescription problem so that it was
unnecessary to treat the implied duty contention. This case left
open the question of whether the above argument would be
accepted to establish an obstacle to the use of a servitude. The
court provided a negative answer one year later in Hightower v.
Maritzky.7 The exclusive leasing privilege was not considered an
obstacle because it was created with the consent of the servitude
owner. There is no suspension of prescription under article 792
when conditions exist by consent. The court in Hightower also
considered the contention that the executive was an implied
agent of the non-executive and therefore could not acquire by
prescription the property rights held for his principal. This doctrine was held inapplicable on the grounds that it concerned
5. 222 La. 200, 62 So.2d 273 (1952).

6. 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939).
7. 194 La. 998, 195 So. 518 (1940).
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acquisitive prescription only, and also that no contract stipulations purported to create an agency relationship. 8
In Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Guillory,9 a 1947 case, the Supreme Court found no implied or contractual obligation on the
part of the landowner/executive to grant a lease. Preservation of
a royalty was made to depend on the simply potestative condition of the landowner leasing. Such a condition is not purely
potestative, because of the material detriment the landowner
would suffer by turning down a reasonable lease offer. 10
After the Guillory case, the Supreme Court handed down
a decision which seemed to shake the foundation of the previous holdings. Horn v. Skelly Oil Co. 1 characterized a grant of
the exclusive leasing privilege by a mineral owner as a "mandate coupled with an interest.' 12 This statement was not necessary for resolution of the particular problem facing the court, but
had the non-executive been a party to the suit the above characterization would have been a direct holding that the executive
has a duty to act in the non-executive's best interest. Such a duty
would require execution of a lease within the prescriptive
period so that the servitude could be preserved by use or extended during the primary term of the lease. The apparent reversal of the previous thinking which this dictum indicates has
not developed. The next case dealing with this problem, Nolen
v. Bennett, 3 decided in the Second Circuit, ignored the Horn
dictum altogether. On virtually identical facts the court held
there was no contractual or implied agency relationship between
the executive/landowner and the non-executive. Thus no extension of the prescription occurs during the primary term of a lease
on the theory that agency makes the executive a joint lessor with
the non-executive. This same court of appeal, however, in a later
case, Namie v. Namie,14 did find a contractual agency relationship to exist between similarly situated parties. This relationship made a lease, executed during the life of the non-executive
interest, joint and therefore extended prescription for at least the
primary term. A dissenting opinion, however, correctly points
8. Martel v. A. Veeder Co., 199 La. 423, 6 So.2d 335 (1942), followed the
same reasoning as Hightower v. Maritzky, 194 La. 998, 195 So. 518 (1940), on
similar facts.
9. 212 La. 646, 33 So.2d 182 (1947).
10. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2034, 2035.
11. 224 La. 709, 70 So.2d 657 (1952).
12. Id. at 719, 70 So.2d at 660.
13. 119 So.2d 636 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960).
14. 134 So.2d 572 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

out that any contractual agency relationship which requires the
executive agent to, in effect, execute a joint lease, thereby possibly extending the prescriptive period, is potentially a means to
waive prescription in advance, in violation of Civil Code Article
3460.
In Uzee v. Bollinger,15 decided by the First Circuit in 1965,
the issue was whether the executive/landowner owed his vendor/royalty owner the fiduciary duty of an agent or at least the
lesser duty "to deal fairly and in good faith." The executive had
secured for himself, in agreements subsequent to the lease, overriding royalties and production payments. The non-executive
argued that obtaining the benefits of production for himself only
was a breach of the executive's implied duty to his royalty interest. Implied agency was rejected. In support of this rejection
the court relied heavily on the earlier cases favorable to its position and distinguished, on questionable grounds, the two decisions which were unfavorable.' The court also held untenable
the contention that the executive had an implied duty of fair
dealing and good faith. The court's position in regard to this duty
is not as clear as the agency rejection but the result was just as
definite. The stated basis for this result was construction of
party intent and "express"' 7 contract stipulations.
The most recent case in this area, Gardner v. Boagni,5 was
decided by the Supreme Court in 1968. The contract created a
mineral royalty provided that the landowner/executive would
obtain at least a 1/8th royalty in entering any lease. "Excess
royalty" above 1/8th was expressly subject to the participation
of the royalty owners. Bonuses, rentals, and other considerations
"except royalties"' 9 were granted to the executive.
The executive entered into a 1/8th lease and simultaneously
executed a separate contract with the lessee securing an overriding royalty payable to the executive alone. The royalty owner
alleged that the override was "excess royalty" in which he
should share. The court held the overriding royalty was not
15. 178,So.2d 508 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
16. The court distinguished Horn v. Skelly Oil Co., 224 La. 709, 70 So.2d
657 (1952), on the ground that the case being considered involved a question
of distribution of lease benefits rather than prescription. Namie v. Namie,

134 So.2d 572 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961), was distinguished because there was an
express agency found in the Namie contract.
17. See Uzee v. Bollinger, 178 So.2d 508, 513 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
18. 252 La. 30, 209 So.2d 11 (1968).
19. Gardner v. Boagni, 252 La. 30, 34-36, 209 So.2d 11, 13 (1968) (opinion
included the pertinent section of the partition agreement).
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royalty, but a form of bonus 20 and therefore due the executive
by the terms of the contract. The court rejected implied agency
and fiduciary duty of the executive. In this regard Uzee was the
only authority cited, indicating approval of that court of appeal's
one-sided analysis of the cases in the area. The Supreme Court's
"mandate coupled with an interest" dictum of Horn v. Skelljj
Oil Co. 21 was not mentioned. The Gardner case also indicated that
any duty of fair dealing less than agency must be expressed ii
the contract to bind the executive.
In summary, Louisiana has not established any implied duty
in the executive, non-executive relationship. On the contrary,
the courts have clearly rejected the implied agency doctrine with
its corresponding duties. Specifically, the executive is deemed
not to be the agent of the non-executive for the purpose of coIr
lecting bonuses and rentals. The executive is, in fact, entitled to
these interests for himself regardless of the characterization of
the outstanding non-executive right. Failure to lease the mineral right by the executive is not considered a breach of duty)
fiduciary or otherwise. This is true even though the executive
holds the reversionary right in the non-executive's interest.
Should the executive lease, he does so on his own behalf only,
and not as agent of the non-executive. The non-executive is not
a co-lessor with the executive and thus is not a necessary party to
22
a valid lease.
The rejection of executive duties less than those of an agent
has not been as clear. Absence of duty, however, is indicated by
the courts' refusal to impose executive obligations not expressed
by contract. Even in dealing with contract stipulations the interpretation has favored freedom of the executive to act selfservingly. Where exceptionally high royalties have been obtained
20. This is contrary to the general United States view of the meaning
of bonus. The former Texas definition of bonus as anything in excess of

1/8th of production. (State Nat'l. Bank of Corpus Christi v. Morgan, 135 Tex.
509, 143 S.W2d 757 (1940), was repudiated by the Texas Supreme Court in
Griffith v. Taylor, 156 Tex. 1, 291 S.W.2d 673 (1956). See 2 H. WILLIAMS. &
C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 328, at 100 (1964), 1968 Supp. at 14, discussing
the Griffith decision: "In effect, this opinion repudiates the theory that

production interests in excess of the usual 1/8 royalty are bonus. It confirms
the theory that royalty is an interest in production not coterminous with
the lease. Other cases, save one, are in accord with this view." The excepted
case is Sykes v. Dillingham, 318 P.2d 416 (Okla. 1957).)
21. 224 La. 709, 719, 70 So.2d 657, 660 (1954).
22. Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939). See also Spiner v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 94 F. Supp. 273 (W.D. La. 1950), holding that under
Louisiana law a royalty owner has no standing to sue to have lease obliga-

tions enforced on a lessee.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

in the lease contract through bargaining, the executive has been
able to secure these benefits solely for himself by simultaneous
or subsequent agreement with the lessee.
Although the cases have involved related problems of similarly situated parties, they can be divided into three types of
disputes. First are the disputes concerning distribution of benefits
which were not provided for by contract. The second group of
cases involves questions which directly pertain to prescription
of the non-executive interest. The last category is more clearly
concerned with the related questions surrounding imposition of
an executive duty to deal fairly with the non-executive interest
once the decision to lease has been made. Because of the interrelationship of these questions a decision in any of the three disputed areas could possibly affect one or both of the others.
Creating an implied agency relationship to insure fair dealing
could, for instance, have quite an impact on the prescription
question. As discussed later in the section dealing with public
policy, considerations such as these are indicated in all of the
cases.
The Louisiana Legislation
As the cases indicate, no Louisiana legislation clearly requires the implication of an executive duty in these relationships.
On the other hand, no legislation precludes such a construction.
The Civil Code requires good faith performance of all agreements2 3 and provides for implication of obligations in certain
circumstances. Louisiana courts have required the lessee to perform certain implied obligations in mineral leases. This implication is based upon the intention of the parties to produce the
maximum of oil and gas from the lease. These obligations are
obviously an application of a standard of care imposed on the
lessee. Conceptually the legislative base for this reasoning would
also support an implied duty in the executive, non-executive relationship. In this regard, several articles of the Civil Code appear to be important even though the cases discussed above did
not mention them or any other legislation concerning this subject. When read together these articles require good faith performance of obligations and allow judges to extend contractual
obligations beyond those expressed. To be susceptible of extension the obligation must by equity, law, or custom be incidental
23. LA. COv. CoD

art. 1901.
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to the contract or necessary to carry it out;24 be the "true intent"
of the parties;25 and not enlarge or restrain intent which is evident and lawful. 26 There is no reason why these articles would
not support judicial enforcement of some implied executive obligations.
Public Policy Considerations
Discovery of the policy considerations which influenced the
decisions in this area is somewhat difficult. The opinions have
not expressed policy as a basis for the rejection of implied executive duties. In light of the legislation permitting such implication, however, policy is the most logical explanation for the
direction the courts have taken. In an attempt to isolate the influential policy considerations involved in the courts' refusal
to impose implied executive duties, the mineral lessor-lessee relationship is a valuable indicator. The fact that implied obligations have been found to exist in that relationship eliminates
the possibility that some overriding policy in the area of Louisiana law of obligations precludes duty implication. The analogy
to the mineral lease is particularly appropriate because it is part
of the mineral property system. A major distinction between
rights created by these two types of contracts in their relation
to the property system is prescriptibility. Termination of outstanding mineral interests by prescription is the single most important feature of our mineral property system.27 Mineral leases,
however, are not prescriptible. It is conceivable, therefore, that
in the case of prescriptible mineral rights the courts have been
interested in protecting the system of prescription, whereas no
such factor has marked evolution of the lessor-lessee relationship. The question is thus narrowed to whether imposing a standard of care on the executive necessarily offends Louisiana's
liberative prescription policy.
One duty which other jurisdictions have imposed appears
more troublesome than any other-the requirement that under
appropriate circumstances the executive must lease. In the relationship between a landowner and the owner of a mineral servitude or between either a landowner of a mineral servitude
and the owner of a mineral royalty, requiring the executive to
24. See
25. See
26. See
27. See
Louisiana,

id. arts. 21, 1903.
id. art. 1945.
id. art. 1963. See also id. arts. 1964, 1965.
Hardy, Public Policy and Terminability of Mineral Rights in
26 I.A. L. REv. 731 (1966).
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lease might interfere with the system of prescription. In essence,
the executive would be required to act to his own detriment, but
'on a general, and perhaps higher, level such a duty would by
its nature be a hindrance to the running of prescription. Viewed
in this light, those Louisiana cases which have refused to impose
such a duty are well-founded. In reaching this result, it does not
matter what standard is being argued, whether it be agency or
some lesser duty, for the imposition of any duty to lease would be
antithetical to the system of prescription.
Conceding, however, that the imposition of a duty to
lease would damage the property system, this does not mean
that Louisiana must, perforce, reject entirely the concept that
some duty might be imposed in other appropriate situations.
For example, according to the court's interpretation of the
deed in Uzee v. Bollinger, plaintiff was entitled to one-fourth
of any royalties. In this context, the question is the limit of
the right of the executive to bargain in his own self-interest.
The defendant then contracted for a cash bonus, a sizeable
production payment, and an overriding royalty in addition to
the "lessor's" royalty. The court limited the right of plaintiff
to one-fourth of the lessor's royalty. Certainly plaintiff had no
right to the bonus, and the right to share in the production
payment is questionable. 28 But merely by changing the characterization of an interest in production running for the life
of the lease from "lessor's royalty" to "overriding royalty,"
the executive was permitted to act to the detriment of the
non-executive. In such situations the lessee would have no
interest in this characterization because the economic impact
is the same to him either way.
Admittedly, policy underlying the property system militates
against a duty to act positively for the protection of nonexecutive rights in certain situations; however, the principles
of good faith in the performance of contracts, equity, and the
prohibition of unjust enrichment are all reflective of policy
in our law which disfavor unfair dealing. 29 Thus, it seems that
duties could be imposed on the executive once he does undertake
to exercise his rights. In this regard, it is worth observing that
28. Production payments have been held to be bonus rather than royalty
in Texas. State Nat'l Bank of Corpus Christi v. Morgan, 135 Tex. 509, 143
S.W.2d 757 (1940). See also Jones, Non-ParticipatingRoyalty, 26 TEX. L. REv.
569 (1948). Allowing bonuses to be paid out of production possibly has the
merit of increasing the availability of potential lessees.
29. See notes 23-26 supra.
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not all executive, non-executive relationships are those in which
the executive has an expectancy that the interest over which
he has such rights will expire; and thus prescription may be
irrelevant. For example, it is not uncommon that a mineral servitude owner will have executive rights over the landowner's
mineral interest. In this situation, too, the executive could quite
properly be required to deal fairly with the interest of his
landowner once he undertakes to act.
Whether the standard of care to be imposed on the executive should be that of an agent toward his principal, a standard
of "fair dealing," or some other standard is discussed below.
At this point, however, it can be concluded that if there are
policy considerations which override a duty when its imposition threatens the system of prescription, there are policy considerations of equal force favoring the imposition of a duty when
the system of prescription is not threatened.
Implied Executive Duties in Other Jurisdictions
As stated earlier, Louisiana is the only United States jurisdiction treating this problem which has not found a duty in
favor of the non-executive. Generally, the non-executive interest
in these jurisdictions is not terminable by operation of law and
the abuse of the executive permitting termination does not exist.
When the interest is terminable, such as a defeasible royalty,
even stronger duties are implied for that very reason. 80 This
would not be the case, however, if termination by nonuse for
a set period were an implementation of public policy of the
jurisdiction in question. The conflict between duty and prescription is peculiar to Louisiana. The fact that the other jurisdictions have implied duties is, however, support for the argument that, absent conflicting policy considerations, imposition
of some duty is the most equitable solution to these disputes.
The extent of the duty in other jurisdictions varies considerably.8 ' Full fiduciary duty is applied by some jurisdictions,
whereas others require only fair dealing. The questions of what
constitutes breach of any of the degrees of duty have been
settled quite differently in jurisdictions having the same
standards.
30. See Jones, Non-ParticipatingRoyalty, 26 TEX. L. REV. 569 (1948). See
also 2 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 339.2 (1964).
31. 2 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAw § 339.2 nn. 9-15 (1964):
"Judicial opinions have expressed the [executive]
duty in a variety of
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The United States jurisdictions have imposed a duty on
the executive in a number of specific situations. In other situations, the facts of the executive's actions have been held not
to be a breach of his duty. For instance, an executive's duty to
lease and secure drilling operations has been found where there
was a reasonable likelihood that oil was being drained by wells
on adjacent lands.32 The reasoning advanced in this decision
indicates that a defeasible interest would receive equal protection when threatened by termination without the drainage
factor. However, in regard to a duty to obtain lease terms
designed to maintain a defeasible royalty, an executive was
held to be under no duty to secure a shut-in royalty clause.83
In deciding the questions presented concerning an implied executive duty to obtain available excess royalty in lieu of larger
bonuses the particular situation also plays an important role.
In some cases in which a "usual" royalty has been provided for,
the executive has been allowed to obtain large bonuses in lieu
of excess royalties. 8 4 However, if the executive obtains royalty
less than "usual," obtaining excess bonus by the executive has
been held to be a breach of his duty.3 5
Standard of Care
Acknowledging that in Louisiana the imposition on the
executive of a duty to lease may be undesirable, it is nevertheless desirable to limit the executive's right to bargain in
his own self-interest by some means. If the executive has a
legal right to certain economic benefits flowing from the lease
transaction, such as bonuses, he should be allowed reasonable
freedom to maximize these personal advantages in the process
of negotiation. But he should not by any device or scheme be
permitted to procure for himself economic benefits of the kind
in which the non-executive is entitled to share without procuring the proper proportionate share of such benefits for the
non-executive. The standard of care, or the conceptual characterization of this duty is the next matter of concern.
phrases, 'utmost fair dealing'; . .. 'relation of trust'; 'an implied covenant ...
[to] protect' the royalty interest; 'good faith in the performance . . . [to be
discharged] with prudence and good faith, and with ordinary care and diligence'; and 'utmost good faith'." See also Jones, Non-ParticipatingRoyalty,
26 TEx. L. REv. 569 (1948).
32. Federal Land Bank v United States, 168 F. Supp. 788 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
See also Schlittler v. Smith, 128 Tex. 628, 101 S.W.2d 543 (1937).
33. Union Prod. Co. v. Scott, 173 F. Supp. 361 (S.D. Tex. 1958).
34. E.g., Hudgins v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 144 F. Supp. 192 (E.D.
Tex. 1956).
35. See Schlittler v. Smith, 128 Tex. 628, 101 S.W.2d 543 (1937).
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Calling the relationship between executive and non-executive
a principal-agent relationship is unsatisfactory. Primarily,
such a characterization would inherently require the agent to
act positively-to lease-for the benefit of the non-executive.
The problems of this standard have already been elaborated
insofar as the system of prescription is concerned. But other
considerations disfavor this standard of care. The agent's duty is
that of the utmost good faith. It allows no opposition of personal
interest against that of the principal. The situations here under
consideration, however, assume an opposition of interests between the parties; they assume a legitimate self-interest on the
part of the executive. Thus, the principal-agent characterization
is unsuitable.
Several other jurisdictions have characterized the duty
as one of "fair dealing." Admittedly this is an imprecise term,
but it is suitable insofar as it indicates a duty less than "utmost
good faith." It is suggested that in Louisiana it would be
appropriate to articulate the executive's duty as a duty of dealing
fairly with the non-executive's interest once the executive undertakes to act, in the same manner that a prudent owner would
act if the non-executive interest were joined with his own. This
duty might be viewed as a specific application of the principle
that all contracts must be performed in good faith. It is important in this context that a breach of this duty need not be
of such severity as to be called fraud.
Better methods of drafting contracts granting or reserving
executive rights could provide the non-executive with more
protection. The most obvious improvements would be specific
stipulations distributing bonuses, rentals, overriding royalties,
and any other economic benefits. Other problems may be predicted and prevented by looking at those which have arisen in
other states.8 6
But better drafting is only an aid for the future and will
not benefit the non-executive interests already existing. Also
drafting solutions often add needlessly to the length and com36. 2 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 339.3 (1964) discusses:
1. duty to drill: a. explore; b. develop; c. prevent drainage; 2. duty to lease;
3. duty to lease rather than develop; 4. duty to timely exercise leasing right;
5. duties relating to lease terms: a. length of primary term; b. size and
nature of bonus, rental, and royalty; 6. duty to enforce implied lease covenants; 7. voluntary pooling and unitizations by executive. See Jones, NonParticipatingRoyalty, 26 TEx. L. REv. 569 (1948); Martz & Hames, Implied
Rights of Royalty Owners, 1957 THIRD ANNUAL ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL
LAW INSTITUTE 195.
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plexity of contracts. Even as an aid in the future, drafting
is a limited solution because many stipulated obligations would
face the problems encountered by an implied duty. For example,
an express obligation to lease might cause the courts to favor
those policy considerations underlying the system of prescrip7
tion, resulting in a refusal to enforce such a duty.
The limitations of drafting solutions suggest that an alteration in the present position on judicial imposition of implied
executive duties is the only manner by which non-executive
interests can be assured of fair treatment at the hands of the
executive. As indicated, it is proper for Louisiana to reject a
duty to lease, but in granting a lease the executive should be
required to treat the non-executive interest as an ordinary
and prudent landowner would treat it if it were joined with
his ownership of the land. In administering this standard of
care, failure to lease or secure lessee obligations designed to
prevent the non-executive interest from prescribing could simply, as a matter of law, be deemed no breach of the standard.
If such protection is afforded existing interests, and progressive
drafting techniques are successful in securing benefits for
future interests, much of the imbalance present in the mineral
executive, non-executive relationship will be alleviated.
Blance G. Iverson
37. In regard to a duty to lease, it has been suggested that the obligation
may be expressed as a personal one rather than real. This would give the
non-executive whose interest had prescribed because of a breach of this duty
a right to money damages only. This approach may well be a partial answer
to the problem of drafting obligations which would otherwise encroach upon
liberative prescription. The problem created by this suggestion, of determining the amount of damages in cases where there has been no development, should not be insurmountable. See Risinger, Executive Righta in
Loasiana,
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